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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Rice is increasingly becoming a commercial crop, 
providing food, employment, and income for people 
in both rural and urban areas. This paper presents 
the political economy of rice commercialisation in 
Tanzania. It is based on a review of trade policies, 
regulations, strategies, and programmes implemented 
since the 1960s to promote rice commercialisation, 
and the views of key informants. The transformation 
of rice from a subsistence to a commercial crop 
has attracted several actors, including producers, 
processors, traders, input suppliers, and service 
providers. The actors operate at different scales with 
different interests and holding power. 
Key findings that emerge from the review of literature 
and key informant interviews indicate that the 
performance of the value chain over time has been 
negatively affected by the combined effects of the 
policies, regulations, strategies, and programmes 
implemented concurrently. Tanzania’s import policies 
are inconsistent, in terms of intermittent import permits 
and the failure to apply the 75 per cent import duty agreed 
for East Africa Community (EAC) trade to Zanzibar. 
This has benefitted large importers, who could lobby 
the government for permits, as well as encouraged the 
smuggling of cheap rice imported through Zanzibar 
to Tanzania’s mainland. Local producers, especially 
smallholder famers, have been negatively impacted by 
these import policies, as they are unable to compete 
with the cheap imports smuggled from Zanzibar and 
sold at low prices. This has led to the widening of wealth 
inequality between large and small actors in the rice 
value chain. The negative consequences of the import 
permits and failure to apply the 75 per cent import 
tariff to Zanzibar have been exacerbated by export 
bans, export permits, ineffectual input subsidies, and 
agricultural strategies and programmes designed to 
commercialise smallholder rice production. Overall, 
rice commercialisation has increased inequality and 
social differentiation between large scale and small 
scale actors, as well as between male and female 
actors in the value chain. 
Export bans, as a policy measure to protect consumers 
from rice shortages, have been in place since the 
1980s. They were intermittently removed and re-
introduced until 2012, when they were abolished and 
replaced by export permits. Both export bans and 
permits have had a number of negative consequences. 
The negative consequences of the intermittent export 
bans include the emergence of corruption and black 
markets across borders, the creation of business 
uncertainty, and the failure of farmers to sell their rice. 
Meanwhile, the negative consequences of export 
permits include encouraging corruption, increasing the 
cost of exporting rice, reducing the competitiveness 
of Tanzanian rice, and decreasing the reliability of rice 
delivery times to importing countries, due to delays 
in processing the permits. The costs associated with 
export permits are borne by the producers, who are 
paid low prices. 
Several subsidy programmes have been in place since 
1967, including a pan-territorial fertiliser pricing policy, 
a fertiliser input subsidy for maize in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania, and the National Agricultural 
Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) for small scale farmers 
producing maize and rice in all districts in Tanzania. 
The introduction and expansion of the NAIVS subsidy 
programme coincided with the 2005 and 2010 election 
years, hence it was perceived by the political elite as 
a vote-seeking initiative. The programme benefitted 
political elites and medium/large scale better-off 
farmers (gainers), who purchased vouchers from 
smallholder farmers (losers), hence exacerbating the 
inequality between different socio-economic groups. 
NAIVS was phased out in 2016 due to budgetary 
constraints and replaced by the bulk procurement 
system (BPS) for fertiliser, coupled with indicative 
fertiliser prices and subsidised credit from banks. The 
BPS is operational, but indicative prices and subsidised 
credit for fertilisers have not been successful, leading 
to high fertiliser prices that are unaffordable for small 
scale farmers.
The agricultural commercialisation programmes, 
which have further accelerated inequality, are 
the Agricultural Sector Development Programme 
(ASDP), Kilimo Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’), Southern 
Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), 
and Big Results Now (BRN). The programmes all 
had a strong irrigation component, but they were 
implemented without promoting the use of productivity 
enhancing inputs among smallholder farmers and 
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without considering the financial viability, sustainability, 
and maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure. 
Consequently, the intentions of the programmes to 
increase the productivity and incomes of smallholder 
farmers were not achieved. Instead, the programmes 
increased wealth inequality between smallholder 
famers and large/medium scale farmers, who had the 
resources to buy productivity enhancing inputs. 
In order to accelerate the rice commercialisation 
process, a National Rice Development Strategy (NRDS) 
was launched in 2009 with the target of doubling rice 
output by 2018/2019. The NRDS has a strong irrigation 
component, however, irrigation is promoted hand in 
hand with efforts to enhance access to improved seeds, 
fertilisers, modern agricultural equipment, agricultural 
finance, and agricultural markets, particularly among 
small scale rice farmers. The strategy is also gender 
sensitive, seeking to promote women’s access to land 
in new rice irrigation schemes; encourage the use of 
farm implements that reduce drudgery in farming; and 
improve the inclusion of women in rice production, 
processing, and marketing. In general, the performance 
of the value chain has improved since the launch of 
the first NRDS in 2009. Rice production has increased, 
making Tanzania self-sufficient in rice in the 2017/18 
and 2018/19 farming seasons. However, exports have 
been declining since the 2019/20 farming season, as a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has 
stifled rice exports, causing a negative impact on the 
livelihoods of actors in the rice value chain, particularly 
small scale actors and women as a whole. 
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Rice is increasingly becoming a commercial crop in 
Tanzania, providing food, employment, and income for 
people in both rural and urban areas. It is the second 
most important food crop after maize, in terms of 
the number of rural households growing it. The rice 
industry impacts the livelihoods of about 2.2 million 
people (URT 2019, URT 2009). Given the increasing 
demand for rice, due to the growing human population, 
the rice value chain has become increasingly politically 
important in Tanzania. This paper presents the political 
economy of rice commercialisation in Tanzania, based 
on a review of the policies, strategies, programmes, and 
regulations implemented since the 1960s to promote 
rice production, and the views of key informants. The 
policies, strategies, programmes, and regulations 
implemented have taken the form of import tariffs, 
export trade barriers, government subsidies, irrigation 
programmes, and rice development strategies. Over 
the past 20 years, rice production has increased, 
though with some fluctuations, from 780,000t in the 
2000/2001 farming season to 3.02 million t in 2018/19 
farming season. During the same period, rice exports 
increased from 8,360t in the 2000/2001 farming 
season to 50,000t in the 2018/19 farming season.
Apart from the government policies, which have 
influenced the performance of the value chain, a number 
of challenges have affected the competitiveness of 
the chain. This includes limited access to production 
inputs (Mdemu et al. 2017; Msangya and Yihuan 2016; 
Nkuba et al. 2016). While a number of researchers have 
examined the political economy of various agriculture 
related issues in Tanzania (Poulton 2018; Oates, 
Mosello and Jobbins 2017; Cooksey 2016; Cooksey 
2012; Therkildsen 2011), none of them have provided 
a detailed examination of the political economy of 
rice for a long time period, tracing policies, strategies, 
regulations, and programmes implemented from 
the 1960s to 2020. This paper analyses how these 
policies, strategies, regulations, and programmes, as 
well as the narratives and interests of the key actors, 
have affected the performance of the rice value chain. 
The paper addresses the following questions related 
to actors and their interests; rules and policies; the 
political importance of the chain; and structure, agency 
and intersectionality:
• Actors and their interests – who participates in 
the rice value chain and how do they benefit? 
Are there competing interests that might seek to 
influence policy with regard to the chain, e.g. the 
interests of importers and exporters? What type 
of holding power do actors have? Are there any 
barriers to entry? Who is behind these barriers?
• Rules and policies – Are there individuals or entities 
that seek to gain and benefit from the manipulation 
of resource distribution without creating any 
benefits in the value chain? Who makes the rules? 
Who are the winners and losers?
• The political importance of the value chain – why 
powerful individuals, who do not participate in the 
value chain, might require the chain to function 
efficiently and successfully? e.g. to benefit from 
foreign exchange contributions, or contributions 
to the livelihoods of a critical mass of voters in 
particular parts of the country.
• Structure, agency and intersectionality – What 
are the critical factors (individual agency and 
structural) behind the value chain’s contribution to 
foreign exchange and the livelihoods of people? 
What are the differentiating effects of rice value 
chain commercialisation across intersecting 
social groups?
The paper argues that some agricultural 
commercialisation strategies are chosen over others 
because they are promoted by powerful policy actors, 
who provide useful resources for policy implementation 
and whose narratives are consistent with the interests 
of policy makers. While individual smallholder farmers 
tend to have limited influence on rice commercialisation 
policies, some policies have been implemented to 
solicit their support during national elections. Since 
the 1960s, successive governments have introduced 
policies, strategies, and programmes that support 
smallholder rice farmers, as well as those which 
address the interests of urban rice consumers, who 
are a powerful pressure group, especially during 
elections. The political economy analysis in this paper 
includes analysis of social differences that arise in the 
rice commercialisation process. As the rice value chain 
1 INTRODUCTION
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becomes more commercialised, social differences 
become more pronounced, in terms of access to and 
use of improved agricultural technologies, access 
to and use of agricultural services, and access to 
markets. These social differences are not only a result 
of differences in access to and control of resources, but 
also due to inconsistent policies and regulations. The 
inconsistent policies and regulations have benefitted 
large scale farmers and processors (gainers), with 
the ability to lobby the government, at the expense 
of small scale farmers, processors, and traders 
(losers), who represent the majority. Consequently, 
inequality between different social groups, in terms 
of incomes, food security, and poverty, has increased 
as a result of political and economic strategies for rice 
commercialisation.
The paper is structured into eight main sections. 
Section 2 presents the methodology employed to 
gather secondary information, through a literature 
review and key informant interviews (KIIs). Section 
3 presents an overview of the rice value chain in 
Tanzania, highlighting the political importance of rice 
and the performance of the chain. Section 4 maps the 
rice value chain in Tanzania, describing the various 
stages of the value chain. It starts by describing the final 
markets at the downstream end of the chain, followed 
by descriptions of rice trading through to input supply 
at the upstream end of the chain. Section 5 presents 
the various challenges that limit the competitiveness 
of the rice value chain. Section 6 presents the 
policy context with respect to the rice value chain, 
highlighting import policies and regulations, export 
trade policies and regulations, government subsidies, 
irrigation programmes and policies, and strategies and 
regulations governing the rice value chain. This section 
includes an examination of the most recent policies 
and regulatory measures put in place to prevent 
the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Section 7 
highlights the social differences within the rice value, 
while Section 8 presents the conclusions emanating 
from the literature review and analysis of the responses 
of the key informants.
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This case study employed a combination of two 
information collection methods, namely a literature 
review and KIIs. The review included published and 
unpublished policy documents and documents relevant 
to the study. The information from the literature review 
was complemented with KIIs involving actors and 
service providers in the rice value chain in Tanzania. 
The KIIs were conducted in three phases. The initial 
phase, in February 2020, involved 24 key informants, 
three from each of the following categories: rice value 
chain stakeholders with the ability and willingness to 
discuss the political dimensions of the functioning 
and performance of the value chain (e.g. the interests 
and holding power of different actors and how these 
influence policy and outcomes); private rice industry 
experts; government; donor agencies; producers and 
producers’ organisations; processors and processors’ 
associations; traders and traders’ organisations; 
and input suppliers and other service providers. The 
second phase involved follow-up interviews with 
the same 24 informants, in April 2020, following the 
emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. These follow-
up interviews aimed to get the informants’ views on the 
pandemic and its effect on the value chain. Annex 1.1 
presents the interview guide (checklist) used to solicit 
information from the key informants. The last phase was 
an APRA Commercial Agriculture for Smallholders and 
Agribusiness (CASA) COVID-19 rapid market survey, 
conducted between March and April 2020, involving 
16 rice value chain actors and service providers, to 
further explore the impact of the COVID-19 crisis.
2 METHODOLOGY
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3.1 The political importance of the rice 
value chain in Tanzania
The importance of rice to the Tanzanian economy 
cannot be over emphasised. It is the second most 
important food crop, in terms of the number of rural 
households growing it and the number of people 
depending on it for their livelihood. Rice is therefore 
an important source of food, employment, and income 
to people in both rural and urban areas. This makes 
the rice value chain an increasingly politically important 
value chain. Due to the importance of rice, the 
government of Tanzania has taken various measures 
to commercialise the value chain. This includes 
measures to improve rice productivity, through 
irrigation, to increase producers’ incomes (URT 2019; 
Oates, Mosello, and Jobbins 2017; Therkildsen 2011); 
measures to keep rice prices low, through government 
subsidies to rice producers (Mather and Ndyetabula 
2016; Mather et al. 2016); measures to increase tariffs 
for imported rice, or import bans, to protect domestic 
producers (Nikusekela and Kapande 2018; Cooksey 
2016; Kilimo Trust 2014; Therkildsen 2011); and export 
bans to protect food security (Kilimo Trust 2017b, 
USDA 2016, TANEXA 2012).
It is important to note that the political importance of the 
rice value chain has changed overtime due to changes in 
rice production from a subsistence crop to a commercial 
crop. The commercialisation of the chain has attracted 
several actors, including large scale producers, 
processors, and traders. Most of these large scale 
actors have joined the rice value chain with the objective 
of making a profit, and some have been tempted to 
increase their profits by paying producers low prices and/
or charging consumers high rice prices (Nikusekela and 
Kapande 2018; Wilson 2018; Ngailo et al. 2016; Nkuba 
et al. 2016). The commercialisation of the rice value chain 
has also encouraged the expansion of rice production 
into protected wetland areas at an environmental cost 
(Isinika et al. 2020; Msofe, Sheng, and Lyimo 2019; Nindi 
2014; Mutabazi, Wiggins, and Mdoe 2013, Wiggins et 
al. 2011). This calls for measures to reduce the negative 
environmental impacts of rice commercialisation in major 
rice-growing areas in the country.
3.2 The performance of the rice value 
chain in Tanzania 
The study uses trends in annual rice production and 
rice exports as indicators of the performance of the 
rice value chain in Tanzania. Rice production has been 
fluctuating over time, as evidenced by the fluctuating 
trend in annual rice output since the year 2000 
(Figure 3.1 and Annex 1). For example, rice production 
increased by 239 per cent between 2000 and 2010, it 
then declined by 32 per cent between 2010 and 2012, 
and thereafter increased by 67 per cent to 3.02 million t 
in 2018. The total area of land planted with rice and land 
productivity (yield per ha) are reported to be the key 
drivers of annual rice production (annual rice output) 
(Ngailo et al. 2016; Nasrin et al. 2015; Kilimo Trust 2014). 
According to these studies, increases in the total annual 
rice production in Tanzania have been largely driven by 
an expansion in the total area of land planted with rice, 
rather than an increase in rice yields. Figure 3.1 shows 
that the trends in annual rice production and area of 
land planted with rice exhibit more or less a similar 
pattern. Figure 3.1 also indicates that rice yields have 
been fluctuating since the year 2000. For example, rice 
yields increased from 1.79t/ha in 2012 to 3.07t/ha in 
2016, the yield then declined to 2.47t/ha in 2017 and 
increased slightly to 2.51t/ha in 2018.
Rice yields are reported to be influenced by several 
drivers, including the use of improved seeds (Kitilu, 
Nyamora, and Charles 2019; Kangile, Gabeyahu, and 
Mollel 2018; Wilson 2018); fertiliser use (Wilson 2018; 
Ngailo et al. 2016); pesticide use (Ngailo et al. 2016; 
Kilimo Trust 2014); the availability and management 
of irrigation water (Senthilkumar et al. 2018; Kangile 
and Mpenda 2016); weather variability as a result of 
climate change (Mkonda and He 2018; Nasrin et al. 
2015); basic rice management practices, coupled with 
access to extension services (Kitilu, Nyamora, and 
Charles 2019; Sekiya et al. 2017); and the reliability 
of rice markets (Kangile, Gabeyahu, and Mollel 2018; 
Nikusekela and Kapande 2018; Wilson 2018). These 
studies report productivity or yield gains when farmers 
use improved seed, fertiliser, pesticides, irrigation, and 
basic rice management practices such as land levelling, 
3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE RICE VALUE CHAIN 
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planting rice lines, planting in recommended spacing, 
and using rotary weeding. Rice yield differences have 
also been reported between smallholder rainfed and 
irrigated rice production systems (Kitilu, Nyamora, 
and Charles 2019; URT 2019; Senthilkumar et al. 
2018). For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (2012) reports average yields of 2.5t/
ha for lowland rainfed rice production systems and 
4t/ha for irrigated rice production systems, while 
Mkanthama et al. (2018) reports average yields of 2t/
ha for lowland rice production systems and 3.5t/ha 
for irrigated rice production systems. The effects of 
climate change are said to contribute significantly to 
yield differences between rainfed and irrigated rice 
production systems, with rainfed rice being more 
prone to negative impacts from climate change than 
irrigated production systems (Mkonda and He 2018; 
Nasrin et al. 2015).
The trend in rice exports is the second indicator used 
to examine the performance of the rice value chain in 
Tanzania. Figure 3.2 depicts the trends in rice exports 
from Tanzania for the period 2000–2018. Like rice 
production, rice exports from 2000 to 2018 have 
exhibited fluctuations. According to Kilimo Trust (2017a 
and 2014) and Wilson and Lewis (2015), Tanzania’s total 
annual rice production, the competitiveness of rice 
exports in importing countries, consumer preferences 
in importing countries, and policy restrictions on export 
trade are the major factors that influence the volume 
of rice exports from Tanzania. The volume of exports 
depends on the quantity of surplus production from 
Figure 3.2: Trends in rice exports from Tanzania, 2000–2018
Source: Annex 2
Figure 3.1: Trends in land area under rice production, rice production, and rice yields in 
Tanzania, 2000–2018
Source: Annex 2
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rice producing areas, which, in turn, depends on the 
total volume of rice produced. Surplus rice production 
lowers domestic rice prices, as well as export 
prices, enabling rice from Tanzania to compete in 
importing countries (Barreiro-Hurle 2012). According 
to Wilson and Lewis (2015) and Kilimo Trust (2014), 
Tanzanian rice is highly preferred in the neighbouring 
countries of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. However, 
its irregular availability, resulting from the restrictive 
policy environment, disincentivises rice exports to 
these countries. Restrictive policies include high 
export license fees, bureaucracy, and sometimes 
the imposition of full export bans (Kilimo Trust 2017b; 
Wilson and Lewis 2015).
It is worth noting that the performance of the rice 
value chain has generally improved, following the 
government’s decision to give high priority to rice 
through its National Rice Development Strategy 
(NRDS). The implementation of NRDS began in 2009 
(URT 2009). The strategy sought to double rice output 
by 2018 to ensure food security and increase rice 
exports to neighbouring countries. The implementation 
of the NRDS involved the promotion of improved rice 
seed varieties, access to inputs, irrigation development, 
access to markets, research and development, 
access to agricultural credit, and road infrastructure 
development. The production data in Annex 3 indicates 
that the NRDS’s target of doubling rice output by 2018 
has been achieved. Despite fluctuating trends, rice 
production increased from 1.33 million t in 2009 to 2.73 
million t in 2017. However, rice production declined to 
2.22 million t in 2018. Rice export volumes have also 
increased substantially after 2009, despite annual 
fluctuations, as shown in Figure 3.2. The interventions 
associated with the NRDS of 2009 are consolidated 
by the National Rice Development Strategy Phase II 
(NRDS-II), introduced in 2019. NRDS-II seeks to double 
the area of land planted with rice and rice yields from 
1.1 million ha and 2t/ha in 2018 to 2.2 million ha and 
about to 4t/ha in 2030, respectively (URT 2019).
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A value chain is defined as the chain of activities that 
are required to bring a product from its conception, 
through its design, sourcing of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs, processing, marketing and 
distribution, to the final consumer (Kumar et al. 2011). 
The rice value chain in Tanzania has been studied by 
several researchers. The studies can be categorised 
according geographical coverage: (i) studies covering 
one or a few districts (Nikusekela and Kapande 2018; 
Kisanga 2015); (ii) studies covering one or a few regions 
(Ngailo et al. 2016; Wilson and Lewis 2015); and (iii) 
studies covering the whole country (Wilson 2018; 
Nkuba et al. 2016; Kilimo Trust 2014). Irrespective of 
the geographical coverage, these studies have used 
a value chain approach to describe the full range of 
activities required to bring a product or service from 
conception, through the different phases of production 
and delivery, to the final consumers, and eventually 
a product’s disposal after use (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001). The activities or stages of the rice value chain 
in a certain geographical coverage, or in Tanzania as 
a whole, are shown in Figure 4.1 and described in this 
section. The value of rice produced increases as it 
moves from one stage to another, until it reaches the 
consumer at the final market.
4.1 Consumption
There are two segments of the final market for 
rice produced in Tanzania, from which consumers 
purchase milled rice: the national market and the export 
market. The national market for rice consists of urban 
and rural markets. The cities, municipalities, and large 
urban centres are the major final markets for rice in the 
country. Dar es Salaam city alone accounts for about 
60 per cent of national rice consumption (Mtaki 2018; 
Nikusekela and Kapande 2018). The major drivers of 
consumption of rice in these areas are the population 
size and household incomes (Nikisekela and Kapande 
2018; Kilimo Trust 2017a; Lazaro, Sam, and Thomson 
2016; Wilson and Lewis 2015). Dar es Salaam has 
Tanzania’s highest gross domestic product per capita 
(at US$1,741, compared with the national average of 
US$1,471 in 2010), the highest urban population, and 
the third largest total population in the country. Rural 
consumption is mainly concentrated in rice producing 
areas, with an estimated 30 percent of locally produced 
rice consumed by the producers themselves (Zaal, 
Bymolt, and Meertens 2012, Kilimo Trust, 2014). 
Regarding the export market segment, the 
neighbouring countries of Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, 
and Zambia are the major export markets for 
Tanzania’s rice. Tanzania is a leading exporter of rice 
in East Africa (EUCORD 2012). It exports an average 
of 51,200t annually to these neighbouring countries. In 
2017/18, Tanzania exported more than 5,000t of rice, 
worth more than US$700,000 to Kenya (Mtaki 2018). 
Rice exports to neighbouring countries accounted 
for about 5 per cent of the market for Tanzanian rice 
production during the early 2000s (Kilimo Trust 2014). 
However, not all exports appear in official records due 
to informal cross border trade, through routes that 
bypass customs posts at the borders. 
In both the national and export markets, the major 
market requirements are aroma, colour, grain length, 
wholeness, and non-sticky grain. Rice grains that are 
translucent, clean, aromatic, long, and not broken are 
highly demanded in these markets (Kilimo Trust 2017a; 
Lazaro, Sam, and Thomson 2016; Kilimo Trust 2014). 
Apart from the above requirements, the export market 
requires well-packaged and branded rice (Mgeni, 
Muller, and Sieber 2019; Kilimo Trust 2017a).
4.2 The trading of paddy and rice 
Various people are involved in paddy and rice trading 
at the farm gate and at various market centres in rural 
and urban areas. These include rice farmers, traders, 
wholesalers, and processors. Rice farmers in rice 
producing areas in Tanzania sell either un-milled rice 
(paddy) or milled rice. Paddy is sold either directly to 
a small-sized trader or to a processor (Wilson and 
Lewis 2015). Most famers sell paddy, with only a few 
of them (less than 20 per cent) selling milled rice to 
traders (Kilimo Trust 2014). The small-sized traders 
may, in turn, sell to another trader, or directly to a 
wholesaler or processor. Rice traded at market centres 
in rural (non-rice producing areas) and urban areas is 
transported from producing areas by medium-sized 
traders. The major markets for rice in Tanzania include 
the wholesale markets, such as Tandale and Tandika in 
Dar es Salaam city (Kilimo Trust 2014). The wholesale 
4 MAPPING THE CHAIN
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of rice in the national and export market is a function 
of large processors, who have networks with either 
retail stores in the country or export markets, the 
majority of whom are men. Small processors buy 
paddy directly from farmers or small-sized traders 
and sell milled rice to wholesalers or retailers. 
However, there are wholesalers who buy rice from 
processors and either sell it directly in open air 
markets or to retail outlets. Some wholesalers buy 
paddy from farmers and procure a milling service 
from the processors, after which they sell the milled 
rice to retailers. According to Nkuba et al. (2016) 
most of the traders were men at the time of their 
research. There are numerous retailers in rural and 
urban areas, largely located in areas where rice 
consumption is high (Kilimo Trust 2017a). Unlike 
the wholesaling business, which was dominated by 
men, the participation of women as rice retailers in 
the Southern Highlands was high. An estimated 70 
per cent of the retailers interviewed by Nkuba et al. 
(2016) were women.
4.3 Rice processing (milling)
The initial activities that take place before 
processing (milling) rice, include threshing out 
the harvested paddy, and drying and storing it. 
Threshing mainly takes place at the rice farm, 
while drying and storage may take place at the 
rice famers’ homesteads or warehouses owned 
by processors (millers) (Wilson 2018; Nkuba et 
al. 2016; Wilson and Lewis 2015). Threshing, 
carrying the head of threshed paddy, drying at 
homesteads, and cleaning the processing premises 
are predominantly women’s activities. Meanwhile, 
loading and unloading paddy at the processing 
premises and operation of the processing machines 
is mainly done by men. Rice processing (milling) in 
Tanzania has evolved from manually operated mills 
to diesel powered mills, and, eventually, to electric 
powered mills. However, rice processing (milling) in 
the country is still dominated by small millers with 
an operational capacity of 5–20t of paddy per day. 
These small millers probably account for more than 
90 per cent of milling operations in Tanzania (Kilimo 
Trust 2017a). Gender bias exists in the ownership 
of rice processing machines. A survey of rice 
processors conducted in 2018, as part of the rice 
commercialisation research undertaken by APRA, 
indicated that 91 per cent of processors were 
male. Nevertheless, most of the employees in rice 
processing are women. The larger millers, which 
process up to 120t per day, generally operate for 
about five months in each year (Wilson 2018; Kilimo 
Figure 4.1: A typical map of the rice value chain in Tanzania
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Source: Modified from Wilson (2018) and Nkuba et al. (2016)
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Trust 2017a). The small mills are generally associated 
with inferior quality rice (30–50 per cent broken) due 
to poor processing technology, whereas larger mills 
produce ‘grade one’ rice with less than 15 per cent 
broken grains (Wilson 2018; Kilimo Trust 2017a).
4.4 Rice production
Rice is produced across all regions in Tanzania, but 
Iringa, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mwanza, Pwani, Shinyanga, 
and Simiyu regions have a high concentration of rice 
producers of all categories (small scale, medium 
scale, and large scale producers) (Wilson and Lewis 
2015). Rice production systems in Tanzania can 
be categorised into traditional rainfed production 
systems, improved small scale production systems, 
and large scale production systems (URT 2019; Ngailo 
et al. 2016; Nkuba et al. 2016; Wilson and Lewis 2015; 
Rugumamu 2014). Traditional rainfed production is the 
predominant system, accounting for about 74 per cent 
of the area under rice production in the country (Wilson 
and Lewis 2015). This system is dominated by small 
scale farmers, who use limited amounts of productivity 
enhancing inputs, such as improved seeds, inorganic 
fertilisers, herbicides, and pesticides. Although the 
NRDS, implemented since 2009 (URT 2019; URT 
2009), recognises women’s difficulty in accessing 
key factors of production, gender differences still 
exists in accessing productivity enhancing inputs 
for rice production. In Kilombero valley, for example, 
the percentages of female farmers using productivity 
enhancing inputs and technologies during the 2016/17 
farming season were lower than those of male farmers 
(Table 4.1). This was because most female farmers did 
not have the cash needed to buy inputs.
Improved small scale rainfed production, with limited 
irrigation, accounts for about 20 per cent of the area 
under rice production in the country (Wilson and 
Lewis 2015). This is an improved system, whereby use 
of purchased inputs is higher than in the traditional 
rainfed system and, as a result, rice yields are better 
than yields under the traditional system. Large scale 
production systems account for only 6 per cent of the 
area under rice production in the country (Wilson and 
Lewis 2015). The system is dominated by large scale 
commercial farms or companies, such as Kilombero 
Plantation Limited (KPL), which in some cases are 
linked to small scale farmers as out-growers. KPL, 
in collaboration with development partners, has 
promoted a system of rice intensification (SRI), among 
smallholder farmers throughout Kilombero, since 2010. 
A study by Nakano, Tanaka, and Keijiro (2017) showed 
significant yield gains due to SRI training. The system 
involves the intensive use of purchased inputs and, as 
a result, yields are much higher than the other two rice 
production systems.
4.5 Input supply
Seeds, fertilisers, and pesticides (herbicides, 
insecticides, and fungicides) are important inputs for 
rice production. Supply of these inputs varies across 
the rice producing areas in Tanzania (Nkuba et al. 
2016). Regarding rice seeds, there are two systems of 
supply, namely: formal and informal. The formal seed 
supply system mainly consists of the supply of certified 
seed, multiplied by public and private seed companies 
and marketed by registered agro-dealers. The public 
agency involved in seed multiplication and supply is 
the Agricultural Seed Agency. There are 54 registered 
and active seed companies and 500 registered agro-
dealers across the country. The formal seed system 
for rice accounts for less than 10 per cent of all seed 
supplied in the country (Makoi 2016; ASARECA/KIT 
2014). Therefore, most of the rice seed used by farmers 
in Tanzania is uncertified seed, supplied through the 
informal seed supply system. These seeds have either 
been saved by rice farmers from the previous year’s 
harvested rice, obtained from neighbours, purchased 
from producers who specialise in producing seed 
informally, or bought from local markets, where traders 
sell seeds at the beginning of farming season (Kangile, 
Gabeyahu, and Mollel 2018).
With the exception of Minjingu Rock Phosphate 
(MRP), all other inorganic fertilisers (Urea; Nitrogen, 
Phosphorus and Potassium; Di-Potassium Ammonium 
Phosphate) used in rice production are imported. 
There are 12 companies that import fertilisers in 
Tanzania. MRP and imported fertilisers are supplied 
to rice farmers through two distinct formal supply 
chains that serve different types of farmers. The 
first is the chain, which supplies fertilisers through 
Table 4.1: Percentage of farmers who use rice productivity enhancing inputs by gender
Input Male farmers (%) Female farmers (%)
Organic fertiliser 3.0 2.1
Inorganic fertiliser 14.0 10.9
Purchased seed 26.2 13.2
Pesticides 64.5 62.8
Source: APRA survey data (2018)
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registered wholesalers and/or agro-dealers (retailers) 
at commercial retail prices. The second supply chain 
involves rice out-grower schemes, where the buyers 
of rice produced by contracted farmers (e.g. farmers’ 
organisations or companies) obtain fertiliser directly 
from importers and supply this to their contracted 
farmers (Cameron, Derlagen, and Pauw 2017). For 
pesticides, there are seven suppliers in Tanzania. The 
supply chains through which pesticides are supplied 
to rice farmers are similar to the fertiliser supply chains 
(Wilson and Lewis 2015). The formal chains supply 
about 80 per cent of fertilisers and pesticides, while 
the remaining 20 per cent is supplied through informal 
channels, including local markets (Nkuba et al. 2016). 
Informal channels are prone to supply fake fertilisers 
and pesticides of low quality (Lahr et al. 2016; Wilson 
and Lewis 2015).
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Various studies have documented a number of 
challenges that limit the competitiveness of the rice 
value chain in Tanzania. These challenges can be 
categorised into challenges facing specific categories 
of actors and those facing all actors along the whole 
rice value chain (Table 5.1). As illustrated in Table 
5.1, producers appear to face more challenges than 
other actors in the value chain. The challenges facing 
producers have implications for traders and processors 
because they will operate below their capacity as 
a result of low rice production. Challenges that face 
many or almost all actors in the value chain include 
inadequate storage facilities, limited access to finance, 
and too many taxes and levies (Table 5.1). Small 
scale operators are more affected by limited access 
to finance than large scale operators due to their lack 
of collateral (Wilson 2018; Nkuba et al. 2016; Aune et 
al. 2014). However, the challenge of too many taxes 
and levies is more detrimental to large scale operators, 
such as wholesalers and processors (Nikusekela and 
Kapande 2018; Kilimo Trust 2014; OECD 2013). Other 
challenges and their effects on various actors are 
summarised in Table 5.1.
5 CHALLENGES LIMITING THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE RICE VALUE 
CHAIN IN TANZANIA
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Table 5.1: Challenges limiting the competitiveness of the rice value chain in Tanzania
Challenge Actors affected along 
the rice value chain




Input suppliers, farmers, 
small traders collecting 
paddy from farmers, and 
wholesalers 
• High costs of supplying inputs to farmers, hence 
reduced input sales to farmers
• High cost of inputs to farmers, hence limited use of 
purchased inputs, resulting into low rice productivity
• High cost of rice trading business
Lack of linkages 
with rice producers
Input suppliers and 
producers
• Limited business for input suppliers
• Low rice productivity
Limited ability of 
rice farmers to 
afford high-quality 
inputs
Input suppliers and 
producers
• Low rice productivity among producers, limited surplus, 
and hence, limited participation in markets (low level of 
rice commercialisation)
• Limited business for input suppliers
Poor access to 




• Limited use of inputs, hence, low rice productivity 
and low participation in markets (low level of 
commercialisation)
Limited access to 
finance
All actors at all stages 
of the value chain, but 
the challenge is more 
restricting to small scale 
operators at each stage
• Limited ability to supply inputs among input suppliers
• Limited use of purchased inputs, hence, low rice 
productivity 
• Limited trade business among traders
Unreliability and 
variability of rainfall 
conditions with 
the risk of periodic 
droughts and 
floods, which are 
key indicators of 
climate change
Producers, but 
the challenge has 
implications for traders 
and processors because 
they will operate under 
capacity
• Reduced rice harvest or complete crop loss
• Reduced rice supply in the market for traders
• Underutilisation of rice processing facilities
Pest infestation, 
particularly poor 
control of weeds, 
which increases 
labour demand for 
weeding
Producers • Decline in rice productivity
• Increase in rice production costs
• Decline in profit
Poor access to 
markets and low 
prices, particularly 
where rice mills are 
absent
Producers and small 
traders, who collect 
paddy from rice 
producers
• Reduced use of purchased inputs, leading to low 
productivity, low commercialisation level, and low rice 
incomes among producers
• Low participation of traders in rice marketing
Too many taxes 
and levies
Large scale producers, 
processors, and traders
• Increased cost of rice production, processing, and 
trading
• Reduced profit among producers, processors, and 
traders
• Discourages participation of producers, processors, and 
traders in the rice value chain
Source: Kulyakwave et al. (2020), Mdangi et al. (2019), URT (2019), Nikusekela and Kapande (2018), Wilson (2018), 
Mdemu et al. (2017), and Nkuba et al. (2016)
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Government policy and the regulatory framework for 
rice in Tanzania has been evolving gradually since 
the 1980s, when the government of Tanzania started 
implementing economic reforms. These economic 
reforms represented a shift from a public sector led 
economy and administrative control, towards economic 
liberalisation and the encouragement of private sector 
development. Despite the shift towards economic 
liberalisation and the promotion of private sector 
participation in the economy, the government has not 
left the rice sector to be freely influenced by market 
demand and supply forces because of the economic 
and political importance of rice in the country. The 
government policies, strategies, and regulations 
relevant to the rice value chain have taken the form 
of import tariffs, export trade barriers, government 
subsidies, government driven irrigation initiatives, and 
a national irrigation development strategy to promote 
the commercialisation of rice farming.
6.1 Import policies and regulations
Imports of rice into Tanzania have been regulated 
through import tariffs. The import tariffs on rice have 
been increasing over time with the aim of protecting 
local rice farmers from cheap rice imports. In 2005, rice 
import tariffs increased from 25 per cent to a common 
external tariff (CET) for EAC member states of 75 per 
cent (Cooksey 2016; Kilimo Trust 2014; Therkildsen 
2011). However, the application of official tariffs has not 
been consistent. Despite official tariffs, the government 
has been issuing import permits and tariff exemptions 
to major importers to reduce consumer prices, as 
rice is one of the preferred food staples among urban 
dwellers. Additionally, the official 75 per cent duty on 
imported milled rice is applied to Tanzania mainland, 
while Zanzibar, which is part of the United Republic of 
Tanzania (URT), is exempted. According to Therkildsen 
(2011), the decision to set the rice tariff at 75 per cent 
did not meet the intended objective, which was to 
safeguard local production from cheap imports. He 
points out that after 2005, when the CET was set, 
legal imports of rice fell substantially, while smuggling 
rose significantly, notably from Zanzibar. In addition to 
smuggling, compliance with official import tariffs has 
remained at low levels. Therkildsen (2011) and Cooksey 
(2016) largely associate the low compliance with official 
import tariffs with well-connected, large importers, 
who can influence government decisions.
Besides low compliance with official import tariffs, there 
have been intermittent decisions by the government to 
issue permits to large importers, who have exploited 
their connections to lobby the government for duty 
free rice imports. In 2013, for example, the government 
waived import duty on 60,000t of imported cheap 
rice. This left producers, processors, and traders of 
locally produced rice with piles of unsold stocks and 
severe cash flow problems (Wilson and Lewis 2015). 
The decision was contested by several actors in the 
value chain, especially large scale investors like KPL, 
who required protection against cheap rice imports 
(Wilson and Lewis 2015). Consequently, import permits 
were stopped in 2016. Opinions from the KIIs (with 
political economy experts, private sector stakeholders, 
industrial experts, producers, processors, and traders) 
were that such tariff exemptions were highly detrimental 
to the rice sector. They associated the prevalence of 
government tariff exemptions with two aspects. The 
first was the absence of a mechanism through which 
rice producers and other actors in the rice value chain 
could coordinate to advise or lobby government to 
consistently apply official import tariffs. The second 
was the absence of national level organisations for 
small scale rice producers, millers, and traders.
6.2 Export trade policies and 
regulations
Export trade regulations create barriers in the form of 
export bans and export permits. The reason often cited 
by the government for these barriers is food security 
because rice is a major staple food crop. Export bans 
as a policy measure have been regularly used since 
the 1980s. They were formally lifted for the first time in 
1999, but gained prominence again, during the food 
price peak events in the 2000s, to ensure the availability 
of food and stable prices of cereals in the country 
(Levard 2014). Between February 2002 and June 2012, 
Tanzania had four rounds of export bans – from July 
2003 to January 2006, from August to December 2006, 
from January 2008 to October 2010, and from May to 
October 2011. During the KIIs, the political economy 
experts associated the periodic export bans with 
6 POLICY MAKING WITH RESPECT TO THE 
RICE VALUE CHAIN IN TANZANIA
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political interests, largely because they were abolished 
before elections and then rekindled after elections. The 
government decision to lift the export ban in 1999 was 
associated with the motive of the ruling party to win the 
2000 general elections, while the decisions to abolish 
export bans between 2000 and 2010 were associated 
with the ruling party’s political motive of winning the 
2005 and 2010 general elections (Therkildsen 2011). 
Although export bans have benefitted consumers, 
especially consumers in urban areas, in terms of low 
rice prices, they have several negative consequences. 
The prices obtained among rice producers in regions 
with surplus rice lowered with the imposition of export 
bans, creating a wider price difference between the 
farm gate and destination markets in rice consuming 
areas that were rice deficient. Export bans led to a loss 
of confidence in Tanzania as a reliable rice supplier, 
among buyers of rice in importing countries. It also 
encouraged the emergence of black markets across 
borders with neighbouring countries, as traders tried 
to avoid the ban and maintain export sales. In general, 
export bans have created business uncertainty at all 
levels, to the extent of discouraging investment at all 
stages in the rice value chain (Wilson and Lewis 2015).
Export bans were finally abolished in 2012, following a 
commitment made by Tanzania’s President in bilateral 
consultation with Kenya’s President at the G8 Summit 
in the United States (Makame 2013). The President’s 
decision was made to honour Tanzania’s commitment 
to promote trade among EAC member states and 
the commitment to trade liberalisation, including the 
pledge to the World Trade Organization not to impose 
any new trade barriers (Cooksey 2016). The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
Feed the Future programme’s lobbying for an enabling 
policy environment for the growth of the agricultural 
sector also contributed to the presidential decision to 
abolish export bans (USAID 2016). However, the lifting 
of export bans did not allow free trading of rice between 
Tanzania and its neighbouring countries. To export 
rice and other cereal crops, the exporter is required 
to obtain a letter of authorisation prior to purchasing, 
transporting, and exporting a consignment of rice or 
other cereal food crops (Mtaki 2018; Kilimo Trust 2014; 
Barreiro-Hurle 2012). The need for export permits for 
food crops was determined by the Integrated Food 
Security and Nutrition Assessment System (IFSNAS), 
popularly known in Kiswahili as ‘Mfumo wa Uchambuzi 
wa Uhakika wa Chakula na Lishe’. The problem with 
IFSNAS is that the assessment is general, for the whole 
country, instead of targeting districts prone to food 
deficits (TANEXA 2012). 
The export bans and the procedure of getting export 
permits are highly contested by traders and large scale 
processors of rice, who also perform trading business. 
KIIs held with traders and processors of rice revealed 
that the process of obtaining export permits was very 
bureaucratic. It could take 2–4 weeks because the 
approval process involved district and regional level 
authorities, before the final approval by the Ministry 
of Agriculture. According to the interviewed traders 
and processors, the bureaucracy in obtaining permits 
encourages corruption. They were of the opinion that 
the export permits have contributed to the high costs 
of rice export business, the loss of income, the lack 
of competitiveness, and the unreliability of the delivery 
time of rice to neighbouring countries.
6.3 Government subsidies
Agricultural input subsidies in Tanzania started in 1967 
as part of the ujamaa (socialist) model of economic 
development. This consisted of a villagisation policy, 
the collectivisation of all productive activities, and 
state control of the provision of education, health, 
and infrastructure (Coulson 1982). In the early 1970s, 
a pan-territorial fertiliser pricing policy was introduced 
as a response to food shortages (Larson and Frisvold 
1996). This involved the indirect subsidisation of 
maize production in remote areas, whereby fertiliser 
transport costs were paid by the government instead 
of being paid by farmers. The pan-territorial pricing 
was abolished in 1984 due to escalating government 
expenditure and pressure from donors (Larson and 
Frisvold 1996). Using the importance of food security 
as its main argument, the Ministry of Agriculture pushed 
hard for subsidised fertiliser after it was abolished. 
However, the World Bank and most donors were 
strongly against subsidised fertiliser, arguing that it was 
inefficient in raising production levels, did not benefit 
the poor, promoted rent-seeking (i.e. the manipulation 
of public policy as a strategy for increasing individual 
profits), and was inconsistent with the government’s 
stated agricultural policy (World Bank 2005). Despite 
this resistance, the government reintroduced a fertiliser 
subsidy in the four major maize growing regions in the 
Southern Highlands of Tanzania, following a drought 
in the 2002/2003 farming season. The subsidy was 
extended to all regions in the 2005 election year. In 
2009, the World Bank decided to support government 
efforts to establish and expand the fertiliser programme 
to cover all rice and maize-growing districts in the 
country (World Bank 2009). The subsidy was also 
extended to seeds and provided as a package with 
fertiliser through a National Agricultural Input Voucher 
Scheme (NAIVS). NAIVS was introduced in 2008 and 
intended to support smallholder farmers (Minot and 
Benson 2009). In the 2009/10 farming season, input 
vouchers were said to have been distributed to 1.5 
million households (Agricultural Council of Tanzania 
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2012; World Bank 2014). During the 2016/2017 financial 
year, the government distributed about 2.9 million input 
vouchers (Lawson et al. 2017).
Political economists associate the pattern of 
reintroduction and extension of the subsidy 
programme with the political motives of the ruling 
party to win elections because they coincided with 
the 2005 and 2010 election years (Cooksey 2012; Pan 
and Christiaensen 2012; Therkildsen 2011). Cooksey 
(2012) argues that both vote-seeking and patronage 
motivate agricultural policy, but the benefits to voters, 
in terms of the delivery of public and private goods, are 
appropriated by national and local level elites, as well 
as large actors in agricultural value chains. 
The introduction of NAIVS, which targeted small scale 
farmers with, at most, 1ha of maize or rice, was well 
received by smallholder farmers because input provision 
was their most pressing problem in farming. However, 
targeting these farmers during the implementation 
of NAIVS was a problem due to corruption and 
rent seeking behaviour. The programme, therefore, 
unintentionally ended up benefitting medium and large 
scale farmers, who could purchase vouchers from 
smallholder farmers that failed to meet the requirement 
of covering 50 per cent of the voucher cost upfront. 
This created a wider gap in fertiliser use, leading to 
differences in rice yields, incomes, food security, and 
poverty levels between medium/large scale farmers 
(gainers) and smallholder farmers (losers), as well as 
between male and female smallholders because of 
differences in access to resources and services.
6.4 Irrigation development 
programmes
Tanzania has a long history of traditional irrigation 
systems, which were constructed and managed by 
smallholder farmers through customary arrangements 
(Hakansson 1995). The development of government 
and donor funded modern, large scale irrigation 
schemes commenced in the 1960s, after Tanzania’s 
independence in 1961, with the aim of achieving food 
self-sufficiency, increasing rural employment, and 
reducing Tanzania’s dependency on rice imports 
(JICA, 2002). Disappointingly, most large scale 
irrigation projects did not perform as expected, 
compelling donors to shift their support to small scale 
irrigation schemes in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
management of small irrigation structures was left 
to local government authorities at the village level 
and water users’ associations, while large structures 
remained under the responsibility central government 
(Maganga 2003). Despite these schemes, farmers 
continued to rely heavily on the government to maintain 
and rehabilitate irrigation infrastructure (Patel, Vedeld, 
and Tarimo 2014). 
The situation changed towards the end of the 1990s, 
when the Tanzanian government set out a vision to 
industrialise the national economy and become a 
middle-income country in 25 years. Modernisation, 
commercialisation, competitiveness, and an effective 
agricultural sector were key components of the vision 
(URT 2016). At the same time, water management 
issues featured in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) endorsed by 
African heads of state in 2003. CAADP seeks to 
achieve annual agricultural growth rates of 6 per cent 
and secure 10 per cent of the national budget for the 
agricultural sector (Cooksey 2013). In response to the 
CAADP targets, the agricultural budget increased 
substantially during the launch of the Agricultural 
Sector Development Programme (ASDP) in 2006. The 
ASDP budget was boosted by basket funding from 
donors (Therkildsen 2011). Although ASDP aimed 
to boost smallholder productivity, food security, and 
incomes, irrigation did not feature strongly in the 
initial formulation of the ASDP. In 2005, the President 
announced a surprise target to reach 1 million ha of 
irrigated land by 2017, which was then included in 
the ASDP drafting process (Therkildsen 2011). While 
not all donors in the ASDP basket fund were happy 
with the President’s announcement, the World Bank 
endorsed a focus on smallholder irrigation (Cooksey 
2012). Thus, the development of smallholder irrigation 
schemes became a political priority after the launch 
of ASDP (2006–2016).
Irrigation was allocated more than 70 per cent of 
the ASDP resources (Cooksey 2012). The National 
Irrigation Development Fund and the District 
Irrigation Development Fund were established under 
ASDP to allocate funding on a competitive basis to 
finance large irrigation schemes and small irrigation 
schemes, respectively (Therkildsen 2011). Since the 
commencement of ASDP implementation in 2006, the 
government has launched a number of programmes 
with strong irrigation components. The first programme 
was Kilimo Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’) in 2009, which 
was placed under the Minister’s Office instead of 
being under the Ministry of Agriculture, where the 
ASDP is placed (Ngaiza 2012). Kilimo Kwanza intended 
to use the private sector as the engine of growth 
for promoting large scale commercial farming. The 
second programme was the SAGCOT, launched in 
2011 as an expression of the commercial vision of 
Kilimo Kwanza (Smalley, Sulle, and Mahale 2014). The 
programme was, ‘a public private partnership that 
sought to contribute to food security, reducing poverty, 
and spurring economic growth in Tanzania through 
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the development of a cohesive, modern commercial 
agricultural area in the “Southern Corridor”’ (SAGCOT 
Centre Ltd 2015). The third programme was BRN, 
which was launched in 2013 with the aim to fast-
track development and achieve ‘quick wins’ in six 
priority sectors, one of which was agriculture. BRN 
targeted both smallholder and commercial agriculture, 
and included setting up collective rice irrigation and 
marketing schemes, as well as improving maize and 
sugarcane production (Coulson 2015).
It is important to note that ASDP has received 
substantial funds in support of small scale irrigation 
from various donors, including the World Bank, the 
African Development Bank, the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency, USAID, and others. This is despite 
the slow take off because of disagreements with donor 
agencies at the initial stages of its implementation 
(Cooksey 2013). According to Therkildsen (2011), 
the World Bank was very influential in shaping the 
programme. Nevertheless, the recent push for irrigation 
expansion appears to come from government, through 
Kilimo Kwanza and BRN initiatives, which are basically 
state-controlled initiatives. Although SAGCOT is also a 
recent programme, which is presented as a government 
initiative, evidence shows that it was driven by donors 
(Coulson 2015; Cooksey 2013). Evidence from various 
evaluations and reviews of the ASDP and the three recent 
irrigation programmes indicate their low performance 
and limited achievement of their intended targets for 
irrigation. For ASDP, the target to irrigate 1 million ha of 
land by 2017, announced by the President in the 2005 
election year and included as one of the ASDP targets 
in 2006, was not achieved and is unlikely to be achieved 
in the near future. This is because land under irrigation 
extended from 264,000ha in 2006, when ASDP was 
launched, to 332,000ha in 2010 and has expanded 
gradually, at about 20,000ha per year, in the years that 
followed (URT 2016). According to Mkonda and He 
(2018), Kilimo Kwanza has sped up the development 
of the agricultural sector, but the challenges that the 
programme intended to address still exist. Meanwhile, 
the progress of SAGCOT’s implementation is reported 
to be slower than anticipated (Byiers, Bizzotto Molina, 
and Engel 2016), and BRN – which is reported to have 
achieved some successes in the water, education, 
and transport sectors – has had limited success in 
agriculture (DFID 2016).
Political economists associate the establishment of 
strong irrigation components under ASDP, Kilimo 
Kwanza, SAGCOT, and BRN with the ruling party’s 
1 See, for example, Manero, Wheeler, and Zuo (2019); Gebrehiwot, Makina and Woldu (2017); Manero (2017); Trang 
and Cuong (2016); Dancer and Sulle (2015); Wendimu, Henningsen, and Gibbon (2015); Bhattarai, Sakthivadivel, 
and Hussain (2002)
political motive to win elections because their 
commencement coincided with the 2005 and 2010 
elections (Cooksey 2012; Therkildsen 2011). Moreover, 
the poor performance of the irrigation components of 
the programmes is associated with political motives 
rather than economic considerations. The irrigation 
schemes were not only dependent on donor funding, 
but they were also developed without considering 
financial viability, promoting the use of productivity 
enhancing inputs, sustainability, and maintenance of 
the irrigation infrastructure. Hence, the intention of the 
programmes to increase the productivity and incomes 
of smallholder farmers were not achieved. Like irrigation 
schemes for other crops in Tanzania, and other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa,  1the rice irrigation 
schemes under ASDP, Kilimo Kwanza, SAGCOT, 
and BRN have increased wealth inequality between 
different socio-economic groups, such as large scale 
and small scale farmers, and male and female famers. 
It appears that these programmes have exacerbated 
inequalities, instead of seeking to redress them. Unlike 
other areas of policy, such as the National Agriculture 
Policy (NAP), for example, Kilimo Kwanza and SAGCOT 
did not appear to place gender issues high on their 
list of priorities. The overarching aim of Kilimo Kwanza 
has been to modernise and commercialise agriculture 
across all scales of production in Tanzania. Kilimo 
Kwanza’s implementation framework comprises of 10 
‘pillars’ of detailed proposals. However, only one pillar 
includes a brief reference to ‘gender-mainstreaming’ 
and strengthening the position of women in agriculture 
(TNBC 2009). On the other hand, the NAP includes the 
aim to ensure that the ‘equitable participation of men 
and women in the production of goods and services 
in agriculture is promoted, while ensuring that benefits 
are equitably shared’ (MAFSC 2013).
6.5 Current policies, strategies, and 
regulations governing the rice value 
chain
The government of Tanzania is currently giving high 
priority to rice through the implementation of the 
NRDS-II, which is a continuation of the first phase 
of the NRDS, officially launched by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives (MAFC) 
in 2009. The first NRDS sought to double rice output 
by 2018 to improve food security and rice exports 
to neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, the second 
phase seeks to double the land planted with rice 
and double rice yields from 1.1 million ha and 2t/ha 
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in 2018 to 2.2 million ha and about to 4t/ha by 2030, 
respectively (URT 2019). Like in ASDP and the other 
initiatives described in section 6.4, irrigation is a major 
intervention in the NRDS. However, the irrigation 
component of the NRDS places emphasis on the 
participation of women and youth in the construction 
and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes, formation of 
farmers’ organisations, and access to land on newly 
developed irrigation schemes. Other interventions 
under the NRDS are geared towards increasing access 
to improved seeds, fertilisers, modern agricultural 
equipment, agricultural finance, and agricultural 
markets. In enhancing access to productivity 
enhancing technologies, modern implements, finance, 
and markets, the strategy emphasises inclusion of 
women. In particular, it emphasises the development 
and use of labour saving technologies and farming 
equipment to reduce women’s workload and drudgery 
in rice production. In addition to these interventions, 
the government continues to implement the BPS for 
fertiliser and a 75 per cent import tax on milled rice 
entering mainland Tanzania. It has also upheld the 
2012 decision to remove export bans. Despite the 
fluctuation in annual rice production since the launch 
of the first NRDS in 2009, annual rice production has 
generally increased towards reaching the target of 
doubling rice output by 2019. Evidence from interviews 
with the officials of the Rice Council of Tanzania indicate 
that rice production in the 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 
farming seasons exceeded domestic demand and 
that mainland Tanzania was no longer importing rice. 
The officials further indicated that the current problem 
was the challenges related to exporting surplus rice to 
neighbouring countries, which have deficit.
The problem of surplus rice has been exacerbated 
since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which 
started in China and spread all over the world. Policy 
measures put in place to prevent the spread and 
effect of the pandemic across the world range from 
total lockdown to the enforcement of the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) health standards, which include 
social distancing and facilities to wash hands in public 
places. Tanzania has not opted for a total lockdown, 
but has taken a number of measures to protect the 
spread of the disease, since March 2020, when the first 
COVID-19 case was reported in the country. Among 
these measures are: closing educational institutions, 
banning public gatherings of more than fifteen people, 
suspending all international flights, a mandatory 
quarantine for all travellers entering Tanzania, and 
enforcing the WHO health standards. In addition to the 
measures taken by Tanzania, most countries in East and 
Southern Africa, including the neighbouring countries 
of Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia, have 
enacted travel restrictions and closed their borders. 
This has affected trade between Tanzania and these 
countries. According to the rapid survey conducted 
by the UN Women (2020), most businesses along the 
Tanzania-Congo, Tanzania-Kenya, Tanzania-Burundi, 
and Tanzania-Rwanda borders had to close down 
because of the strict restrictions along the borders. 
The KIIs carried out in mid-April 2020 and the recently 
completed APRA CASA COVID-19 Rapid Market 
Survey, covering various actors along the rice value 
chain, support the findings of the survey conducted 
by UN Women (2020). This research found that the 
sale of agricultural crops to foreign markets has 
been disrupted, affecting both small and large scale 
farmers, and the sudden emergence of unsold crops 
within the domestic market would depress prices to a 
level that is not be profitable. All the exporters of rice 
to neighbouring countries in East and Southern Africa, 
indicated that they had stopped exporting rice due to 
restrictions on truck entry into these countries, since 
the start of the COVID-19 crisis. This has negatively 
impacted all actors along the value chain, as well as 
service providers, but to different extents, depending 
on the scale of their business operations. The impact 
has been more significant among small business 
operators, such as small rice traders, small scale 
farmers, and small service providers, than among large 
business operators. Furthermore, prices of milled rice 
and paddy rice (unmilled rice) at both the farm gate 
and markets have declined, leading to reduced income 
for business operators along the value chain. This 
research supports the findings of the recent analysis 
by WFP (2020) on prices of rice in the East Africa sub-
region in the face of COVID-19. WFP’s findings indicate 
that prices of rice and maize fell in the first quarter of 
2020, rose modestly, and then stabilised until May 
2020, but remained below both the 2019 average and 
the 5-year average.
The value chain actors and service providers, who 
depend on their own savings to finance their business 
activities, have either reduced the scale of their 
operations or stopped operating. At the input supply 
stage of the value chain, most rice input suppliers 
indicated that the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on 
their businesses has been minimal because the 
pandemic was announced in Tanzania in mid-March 
2020. By this time in the season, most rice farmers 
in the country had already planted rice and the rice 
was at the growing stage, which required limited 
inputs. However, they were sceptical about the serious 
negative impact if the pandemic persisted to October–
December 2020 because some rice inputs, such as 
fertilisers and herbicides are imported. This would 
therefore affect rice productivity in the 2020/21 farming 
season. Low rice productivity would lead to low rice 
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outputs and income from rice production, hence, 
undermining the attainment food and nutrition security. 
According to Mahuku et al. (2020), poverty, inequality, 
and marginalisation are amongst the underlying causes 
of food insecurity and malnutrition. Interruptions to 
agricultural supply chains, caused by restrictions 
imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, are 
likely to exacerbate these drivers. Vulnerable groups, 
especially female headed households, will be more 
affected than better off groups (Gillespie and Whiteside 
2020). Women’s economic and productive lives will 
be affected due to restrictions in movement, as most 
are engaged in informal trade, where they earn less 
and have no social safety nets (Mahuku et al. 2020). 
According to the UNDP (2020), women, who constitute 
70 per cent of all informal cross border traders, have 
been the most affected because they do not have 
access to larger vehicles, and hence, are blocked 
from cross border trading. Consequently, cross border 
communities – particularly women traders – have lost 
their livelihoods because cross border trade constitutes 
a vital source of employment and livelihood for them.
Lastly but not least, the APRA CASA COVID-19 
Rapid Market Survey findings show that some actors 
and service providers in the value chain have found 
creative ways of coping with the negative effects of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes, but is not 
limited to, the following: (i) input suppliers, like fertiliser 
suppliers, changing from trading 50kg to 25kg bags; 
(ii) smallholder farmers selling rice in small quantities 
to meet arising cash needs, instead of selling large 
quantities at once, expecting to sell the rest at 
higher prices after the pandemic; (iii) large traders/
processors buying and stocking large quantities of 
paddy rice as farm gate prices decrease, with the 
anticipation of processing and selling the rice after 
the pandemic; (iv) small processors, who previously 
processed and sold rice that they purchased from 
farmers, in addition to charging others to use their 
processing facilities, stopped purchasing paddy 
altogether and remained with only the one business 
of processing other people’s paddy at a cost; and 
(v) stepping out of the rice value chain to take on 
alternative income generating activities. For example, 
some urban traders interviewed have shifted from rice 
trading to the sale of face masks and sanitisers, which 
are currently in high demand.
All the value chain actors and service providers who 
were interviewed indicated that they have experienced 
losses due to the COVID-19 crisis, which resulted in 
the decline in rice prices at the market and farm gate 
levels. At the same time, rice value chain actors have 
incurred extra costs to meet the health requirements 
of washing hands with sanitisers and, in some cases, 
purchasing face masks to prevent the spread of the 
pandemic. However, small traders, who were not 
able to find alternative businesses, were the big 
losers. Those who were able to take advantage of the 
COVID-19 crisis and switched to the sale of sanitisers 
and face masks are the gainers. The big rice exporters 
to neighbouring countries, who have taken advantage 
of the prevailing low paddy rice prices to purchase and 
stock large quantities of paddy rice for milling, with the 
intention to export milled rice after the pandemic, are 
also likely going to be big gainers.
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As agricultural value chains become more 
commercialised, social differences become more 
pronounced in terms of access to and control of 
resources, access to and use of improved agricultural 
technologies, and access to and use of agricultural 
services. This leads to socio-economic differences in 
value chain outcomes, such as agricultural productivity, 
incomes, assets, poverty, and food security and 
nutrition. In the context of the political economy of 
the rice value chain in Tanzania, social differences 
may occur at various levels along the value chain. The 
differences may occur between different categories of 
actors at each level of the chain, for example between 
different categories of farmers, processors, or traders 
(i.e. small, medium and large), as well as between 
actors at different levels of the value chain, such as 
farmers and traders, or traders and processors.
7.1 The social division of labour in the 
rice value chain 
The major social division of labour in the rice value 
chain, reported in various studies, is the gender 
division in performing different activities in the chain. 
At the rice production level, women constitute 
most of the manual labour force in the cultivation, 
planting, weeding, harvesting, threshing, winnowing, 
and sorting, while men dominate in marketing rice 
(Jeckoniah, Mosha, and Boniface 2020; URT 2019; 
Nikusekela and Kapande 2018). Besides providing 
manual labour for these activities, women spend more 
time than men conducting unpaid care work. This 
reduces their time available for performing different 
activities in the value chain. According Jeckoniah, 
Mosha, and Boniface (2020) women in the Mngeta 
Division of Kilombero District, cook, care for the 
children and elderly, and collect fuel and water for 
household uses, while men participate in the collection 
of water only. According to Msangya and Yihuan (2016) 
and Nkuba et al. (2016), women’s participation in the 
marketing of agricultural products is constrained by 
limitations to their movement placed on them by their 
husbands. Men’s restriction of their wives’ participation 
in marketing can be associated with the desire of men 
to control the income from the sale of agricultural 
products (Achandi et al. 2019; Lyimo-Macha and Mdoe 
2002). Apart from restrictions on movement, placed 
on women by their husbands, cultural norms also 
limit women’s movement outside their homesteads 
and restrict their interactions with people, especially 
men. This further hinders women’s participation 
in agricultural markets (Achandi et al. 2019; Thabit 
2014). In such circumstances, the husband and male 
children purchase consumption needs. These cultural 
norms restricting women’s movements vary from 
one community to another, and are more prominent 
in Islamic communities than Christian communities 
(Agunga, Sanga, and Isaya 2018)
7.2 Social differences in resource 
ownership, access, and control 
Social differences in resource ownership, access, and 
control reported by previous rice value chain studies 
in Tanzania are associated with gender, ethnicity, and 
age differences among rice farmers. Men are reported 
to own more resources, as well as control the use of 
household resources, particularly land, which is the 
basic resource for rice production (Wilson and Lewis 
2015; Achandi et al. 2019). The extent to which women 
can own, access, and control resources in agricultural 
communities is determined by customary laws, 
7 SOCIAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE RICE 
VALUE CHAIN IN TANZANIA
Table 7.1: Area of agricultural land owned according to the sex of the household head in the 
2016/17 farming season in Mngeta Division of Kilombero District, Tanzania





Source: Isinika et al. (2018)
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norms, beliefs, and practices (Galiè, Mulema, and 
Mora Benard 2015; Namubira-Mwaura 2014). A recent 
study funded by APRA on rice commercialisation 
and women’s empowerment in Mngeta Division of 
Kilombero District, Tanzania, supports these studies, 
as shown in Table 7.1.
According to Jeckoniah, Mosha, and Boniface 
(2020), male headed households own more land than 
female headed households, largely because men 
have different means of accessing land, including 
inheritance, renting, purchasing, and allocation by 
village governments or traditional leaders. Meanwhile, 
women access land mostly through renting and/
or purchasing. In the face of underdeveloped land 
markets in most rural areas of Tanzania, inheritance 
and the allocation of land by village government and/
traditional leaders are the dominant means of accessing 
agricultural land. Access to land through inheritance 
and allocation by traditional leaders is usually governed 
by customary laws and norms, which differ between 
patrilineal and matrilineal ethnic communities (Genicot 
and Hernadez-de-Benito 2019; Dancer 2017; Moyo 
2017; Dondeyne et al. 2003). Women have the right 
to access land through inheritance and allocation by 
traditional leaders in ethnic communities with matrilineal 
lineage systems, while men have the right to access 
land through inheritance in ethnic communities with 
patrilineal lineage systems. In these systems, both men 
and women have access to land through marriage. 
Additionally, the Land Act and Village Land Act of 1999 
recognise the right of every woman to ‘acquire, hold, 
use, and deal with land to the same extent, and subject 
to the same restriction[s], as the right of any man’. A 
number of other spousal rights are outlined in the Law 
of Marriage Act of 1971 (Genicot and Hernandez-
de-Benito 2019). However, the contentious issue is 
how the bundle of rights to land is passed from one 
generation to the next according to lineal descent. 
The provisions on women’s property rights in the acts 
omit women’s right to inherit land. For example, in 
matrilineal communities, nieces inherit land, whereas 
in patrilineal communities, sons would inherit the land. 
In practice, however, women still do not have the same 
inheritance rights as the men in either community 
(Dondeyne et al. 2003). Women are generally given 
access to land through a male relative. Consequently, 
gender inequalities and biases against women under 
customary tenure render land inaccessible to women, 
both in terms of ownership and control.
Despite the goals of the 1999 Village Land Act to 
empower women and other vulnerable groups and 
encourage land registration, the outcomes have 
been disappointing. The Act has progressively 
changed customary laws over the past years, albeit 
minutely, particularly concerning inheritance and the 
involvement of women in decision-making and control 
of resources. However, customary rules continue to 
prevail as sons/men inherit more clan land compared 
to daughters/women. Other criteria, such as whether 
women are married, unmarried, or widowed, and their 
level of seniority (eldest and youngest), are also used 
in the inheritance of clan land. In most cases, widows 
and unmarried women are disadvantaged in land 
inheritance. Some non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and relevant ministries have been carrying 
out information campaigns to promote women’s 
equal rights, but success has been limited (TAWLA, 
2013). The gender differences in property rights, 
especially land, has prevented women’s participation 
(especially widows and unmarried women) in rice 
commercialisation, increasing gender differences in 
incomes, food security, and poverty. 
The formalisation of customary land ownership and 
control, through issuing certificates of the customary right 
to occupancy, has improved the security of land rights 
and helped to protect the rights of smallholder farmers, 
especially unmarried women. However, the impact of 
the certificates is still limited in terms of geographical 
coverage, as it has been done in very few regions, 
districts, and villages across the country, due to the high 
costs associated with surveying and producing village 
land use plans. In general, the participation of women 
in rice agricultural commercialisation in the villages that 
have been covered by the certification scheme has 
increased, as they are able to use the certificates to 
access credit (Jehovaness and Thomas 2017).
7.3 Social differences in access to 
and use of improved agricultural 
technologies and services 
Among the challenges limiting the competitiveness 
of the rice value chain in Tanzania, as pointed out in 
section 2 of this paper, are: (i) poor access to and use 
of improved technologies, such as tillage technologies, 
seeds, fertiliser, and pesticides (URT 2019 Mdemu 
et al. 2017; Msangya and Yihuan 2016; Ngailo et al. 
2016; Nkuba et al. 2016; URT 2009); and (ii) limited 
access to and use of agricultural services, such as 
credit and extension services (Wilson 2018; Nkuba 
et al. 2016; Kisanga 2015; Wilson and Lewis 2015; 
Aune et al. 2014; Match Maker Associates Ltd 2010). 
Apart from these challenges causing more prominent 
limitations among small scale compared to large scale 
farmers, there is differential access to and use of these 
technologies and services between male and female 
farmers. Studies that report differences in access to 
and use of improved agricultural technologies show 
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that male farmers have greater access to and use 
of improved technologies and services than female 
farmers, as indicated in Table 7.2. For example:
i. Access to and use of improved seeds is reported 
by Kulyakwave, Shiwei, and Yu (2019), Achandi et 
al. (2019), Kangile, Gabeyahu, and Mollel (2018), 
and Ngailo et al. (2016).
ii. Access to and use of fertiliser and pesticides is 
reported by Isinika et al. (2020) and Akram-Lodhi 
and Komba (2018).
iii. Access to extension services is reported by 
Achandi et al. (2019) and Isaya, Agunga, and 
Sanga (2016). 
iv. Access to and use of credit is reported by Achandi 
et al. (2019), Uronu and Ndiege (2018), Madafu 
(2015), and Thabiti (2014).
Some NGOs and farmer-led initiatives, such as 
Farm Africa, Oxfam, Inades-Formation Tanzania, the 
Network of Farmers Groups in Tanzania (MVIWATA), 
Tanzania Women’s Leaders in Agriculture and 
Environment (TAWLAE), and VECO-Tanzania, have 
been supplementing the delivery of public extension 
services with cost sharing schemes. These schemes 
have been very effective in improving access to 
services among women. However, the cost sharing 
schemes have neither been formally integrated into 
the national extension system, nor has their potential 
to reduce public costs and improve the quality of 
extension services been considered (Isaya, Agunga 
and Sanga 2016; Rutatora and Mattee 2001). Lack of 
operating capital, including credit, is one of the factors 
that limits access to and use of improved agricultural 
technologies (Nakano and Magezi 2020; Makundi 
2017; Ngailo et al. 2016; Ndibalema 2015). As previously 
indicated, female farmers have limited access to formal 
credit from banks compared to male farmers. This is 
mainly due to their lack of collateral for loans, resulting 
from limited ownership of land and other assets that 
can be used as collateral (Isaga 2018; Mmasa 2017). 
Women often depend on informal credit from friends/
relatives, cooperative marketing associations and 
societies, farmer groups, and microfinance institutions, 
like village community banks, as source of agricultural 
credit (Mbuga 2019; Mmasa 2017).
7.4 Differences in rice 
commercialisation levels among 
social groups in the rice value chain 
in Tanzania 
Rice commercialisation – measured using a rice 
commercialisation index (RCI), computed as the 
proportion (per cent) of rice produced in Tanzania that 
was sold during the 2016/17 farming season – differed 
between rice producing households headed by male 
and female farmers. The RCI also differed between 
Table 7.3: RCI by farmer category
Farmer category Mean (%) Median (%) Significance of the 
effect 
Farm size category:
Small scale farmer 57.4 62.9 F = 9.91***
Medium scale farmer 67.4 71.2
Sex of household head:
Male 60.0 66.7 F = 3.462*
Female 53.1 59.0
Notes: *=p<0.1 and ***=p<0.01 
Source: Isinika et al. (2020)
Table 7.2: Percentage of rice farmers accessing productivity enhancing inputs and services
in Kilombero in the 2016/17 farming season according to the sex of the household head
Input/Service Sex of household head (%)
Male Female
Purchased seeds 22.6 16.7
Organic fertiliser 2.8 1.6
Inorganic fertiliser 15.5 8.2
Pesticides 61.4 59.0
Extension service 44.8 39.4
Source: Isinika et al. (2018)
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households with different sized rice farms. Households 
headed by male farmers and medium scale farmers had 
higher levels of rice commercialisation than households 
headed by female farmers and small scale farmers, 
respectively (Table 7.3). The major reason for this 
difference is low productivity, resulting from the limited 
use of productivity enhancing inputs, such as improved 
seeds and fertilisers, as well the limited use of modern 
farm implements and lack of access to extension 
services (Isinika et al. 2020; Mdoe et al. 2020).
7.5 Productivity differences among 
social groups in the rice value chain 
Land productivity (kg/ha) and rice output, among 
other factors, largely depend on the use of improved 
rice technologies, such as high yielding seed varieties, 
fertilisers, and pesticides (Mwatawala, Mwang’onda, 
and Hyera 2016; Wilson and Lewis 2015; Rugumamu 
2014). Therefore, the differences in the use of improved 
rice technologies between different social groups lead 
to rice productivity differences between these groups. 
Akram-Lodhi and Komba (2018), Nkuba et al. (2016), 
Wilson and Lewis (2015), and Thabiti (2014) report 
higher land productivity levels among households 
headed by male farmers compared to households 
headed by female farmers. Meanwhile, Mwatawala, 
Mwang’onda, and Hyera (2016), Ngailo et al. (2016), 
Boniphace, Fengying and Chen(2014), Furahisha 
(2013), Leyaro and Morissey (2013) report a decline in 
rice productivity as famers becomes older. Findings 
from a recent APRA funded survey in Kilombero valley 
in Tanzania show higher mean land productivity and 
rice output among households headed by medium 
scale and male farmers than those headed by small 
scale and female farmers, respectively (Table 7.4). 
Productivity is also reported to differ between famers 
with a formal education and famers without a formal 
education, with land productivity reported to be higher 
for educated farmers than farmers without a formal 
education (Mwatawala, Mwang’onda, and Hyera 2016, 
Kulyakwave, Shiwei and Yu 2019). This is because 
formal education provides farmers with knowledge and 
a better understanding of improved farming practices 
(Kulyakwave, Shiwei and Yu 2019).
7.6 Income, food security, and poverty 
among social groups in the rice value 
chain 
Rice productivity (yield) determines the income level 
achieved by rice farmers, which in turn contributes to 
food security and poverty reduction at the household 
level, depending on how the income is used by the 
controller of income. Like the differences in rice 
productivity, several studies report differences in 
income, food security, and poverty among different 
social groups involved in rice production in Tanzania. 
Jeckoniah, Mosha, and Boniface (2020), Kulyakwave, 
Shiwei and Yu (2019), Achandi et al. (2019), 
Akram-Lodhi and Komba (2018), and Mwatawala, 
Mwang’onda, and Hyera (2016) found income levels 
from rice production among households headed by 
female farmers are significantly lower than the income 
levels among households headed by male farmers. 
For example, in Kilombero valley in Tanzania, the mean 
income per household among male rice farmers was 
TSh2,827,012, in the 2016/17 farming season, which 
was more than twice the mean income among female 
rice farmers at TSh1,221,899. In the same location, 
food insecurity and poverty levels among households 
headed by medium scale and female farmers were 
significantly higher than the food insecurity and 
poverty levels among households headed by male 
farmers (Table 7.5).
Table 7.4: Rice yield and output per household in the 2016/17 farming season according to 
farmer 
Farmer Category Paddy yield (kg/
ha)
Mean difference Paddy output (kg) Mean 
difference
N Mean N Mean
Farm size category:
Small scale farmer 411 2552 334** 415 3592 13103***
Medium scale farmer 90 2218 90 16695
Sex of household head:
Male 443 2501 -77.1 443 6344) 3392.1***
Female 62 2424 62 2951
Notes: Independent sample t-test was used to compare the means. ***=p<0.01 and **=p<0.05
Source: Isinika et al. (2020)
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7.7 The influence of rice 
commercialisation on rice 
productivity, household income, food 
security, and poverty in the rice value 
chain in Tanzania 
Agricultural commercialisation is widely pursued 
in different countries with the aim of improving farm 
income, food security, and the general welfare of 
farmers. Empirical evidence shows that it may lead 
to the intended positive effects (Mutabazi, Wiggins, 
and Mdoe 2013; Barrett 2008). However, empirical 
evidence also shows that it may have unintended 
negative impacts at the household level, such as a 
failure to improve household food security and nutrition 
and reduce poverty among the poor (Ogutu, Godecke 
and Qaim 2020; Gebremariam and Wünsher 2016; 
Zhou, Minde, and Mtigwe 2013). In the rice value chain 
in Tanzania there are few studies that have attempted 
to examine the interaction between agricultural 
commercialisation or single crop commercialisation 
and household food security, nutrition, and poverty. 
Mdoe et al. (2020), Mbegalo (2016), and Wilson and 
Lewis (2015), report a positive relationship between 
commercialisation and food security and nutrition in 
Tanzania. Meanwhile, Isinika et al. (2020) and Mdoe 
et al. (2020), report a positive relationship between 
commercialisation and a reduction in household 
poverty levels in Kilombero, Tanzania.
Table 7.5: Percentage of food insecure and poor households among rice producers in 
Kilombero valley, Tanzania by farmer category
Farmer category Food insecure 
households (%)
 χ2 Poor household  χ2
Farm size category:
Small scale farmer 33.4 7.64*** 48.0 1.9
Medium scale farmer 16.4 38.8
Sex of household head:
Female 47.6 9.15*** 49.1 7.1***
Male 27.8 30.5
Notes: *=p<0.1 and ***=p<0.01 
Source: Mdoe et al. (2020)
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In general, the findings presented in the paper 
show that inconsistent import trade policies, 
implemented concurrently with export trade policies, 
subsidies, and agricultural commercialisation 
programmes, have not achieved the expected 
outcomes of increasing productivity, promoting rice 
commercialisation, increasing income, and reducing 
poverty among smallholder rice farmers in Tanzania. 
On the contrary, these policies and programmes 
have had combined differential effects on different 
actors in the rice value chain. In particular, they have 
created wealth inequality between large scale and 
small scale operators, as well as between men and 
women. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of 
the individual policies and programmes.
Import tariffs were introduced to protect local 
producers from cheap imported rice. However, the 
exemption of Zanzibar from applying the 75 per cent 
import tariff agreed by the EAC, have not succeeded 
in protecting local producers from cheap rice imports. 
This is because the exemption of Zanzibar from the 
import duty on imported milled rice has encouraged 
the smuggling of cheap imported rice across the Indian 
Ocean to Tanzania mainland. This cheap imported 
rice, mainly sold in urban markets, has reduced the 
competitiveness of domestic producers in supplying 
the growing urban markets, where most of the locally 
produced rice is consumed. Since the import duty is 
intended to protect domestic producers, deliberate 
efforts should be made by the responsible parties in 
Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland to ensure that the 
duty applies to both Zanzibar and Tanzania mainland. 
Additionally, the government, through its Ministry of 
Agriculture, should promote the formation of a national 
smallholder rice producers’ association and build its 
capacity to lobby the government to consistently 
apply the official import tariff to both Zanzibar and 
mainland Tanzania.
Export bans have been used as a policy measure 
to protect consumers from rice shortages since the 
1980s. They were intermittently removed and re-
introduced until 2012, when they were abolished 
and replaced with export permits. Both the export 
bans and permits have had a number of negative 
consequences. The negative consequences of the 
intermittent export bans include the emergence of 
corruption and black markets across borders, creating 
business uncertainty and causing farmers to fail to 
sell their rice. Meanwhile, the negative consequences 
of export permits include encouraging corruption, 
increasing the cost of exporting rice, causing poor 
competitiveness of Tanzanian rice, and reducing the 
reliability of the delivery time for rice to importing 
countries, due to delays in processing the permits. The 
costs associated with export permits are borne by the 
producers, who are paid lower prices for rice. In order 
to protect farmers, the issuance of export permits, 
when necessary, should be decentralised to the 
local authorities to avoid traders having to travel long 
distances for the permits; and/or permit applications 
and payments should be completed electronically to 
avoid bureaucracy and the possibility of corruption. 
Several subsidy programmes have been in place since 
1967, including a pan-territorial fertiliser pricing policy, 
a fertiliser input subsidy for maize in the Southern 
Highlands of Tanzania, and the NAIVS for small scale 
farmers producing maize and rice in all districts in 
Tanzania. The introduction and expansion of the 
NAIVS subsidy programme coincided with the election 
years, hence it was perceived as a vote-seeking 
initiative. Consequently, the programme benefitted 
political elites and medium/large scale, better-off 
farmers (gainers), who purchased vouchers from 
smallholder farmers (losers) when they failed to pay 
an advance for the vouchers. Hence, the programme 
exacerbated the inequality between different socio-
economic groups. NAIVS was phased out in 2016 due 
to budgetary constraints and replaced with BPS for 
fertiliser, coupled with indicative fertiliser prices and 
subsidised credit from banks. The BPS is operational, 
but the indicative prices and subsidised credit to 
farmers have not been successfully operationalised. 
This has led to (i) the failure of smallholder farmers 
to purchase fertiliser due to a lack of cash, and (ii) 
high fertiliser prices, which are unaffordable among 
smallholder farmers, particularly in remote areas, 
where the cost of delivering fertiliser from the Dar 
es Salaam port is high. This suggests that policy 
interventions should be geared towards lowering the 
cost of fertiliser delivery to remote areas and/or the 
provision of credit for purchasing inputs. Credit could 
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be provided during the planting season and recovered 
during the rice harvesting season. Agreements could 
be made for the government to provide a guarantee 
to large rice traders, who provide credit in the form of 
inputs to contracted farmers.
Agricultural commercialisation programmes that have 
further accelerated inequality are the ASDP, Kilimo 
Kwanza (‘Agriculture First’), SAGCOT, and BRN. These 
programmes had a strong irrigation component, 
but were implemented without promoting the use of 
productivity enhancing inputs among smallholder 
farmers and without considering their financial viability 
and sustainability, or the maintenance of the irrigation 
infrastructure. Consequently, the intention of the 
programmes to increase the productivity and incomes 
of smallholder farmers were not achieved. Instead, 
the programmes increased wealth inequality between 
smallholder famers and large/medium scale farmers 
with the resources to buy productivity enhancing 
inputs. The weaknesses of the programmes can be 
addressed in existing and future programmes by (i) 
encouraging local government authorities to analyse 
economic viability before investing in new irrigation 
schemes and establish maintenance plans for 
irrigation infrastructure, (ii) mainstreaming gender in 
the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation of irrigation programmes, with a view 
to promoting equality between women and men, (iii) 
promoting the use of productivity enhancing inputs 
concurrently with irrigation, and (vii) empowering 
smallholder farmers to access these inputs.
In order to accelerate the rice commercialisation 
process, the NRDS was launched in 2009 with the 
target of doubling rice output by 2018/2019. The NRDS 
has a strong irrigation component, but unlike previous 
programmes, irrigation is promoted concurrently 
with efforts to enhance access to improved seeds, 
fertilisers, modern agricultural equipment, agricultural 
finance, and agricultural markets, particularly among 
small scale rice farmers. NRDS is also gender sensitive 
as the strategy planning and implementation process 
has considered all gender dimensions in seeking 
to improve gender equality in access to resources 
and rice production technologies. In general, the 
performance of the rice value chain has improved since 
the launch of the first NRDS in 2009. Rice production 
has increased, making Tanzania self-sufficient in rice 
during the 2018/19 and 2019/20 farming seasons. 
However, during the 2019/20 season the COVID-19 
pandemic stifled rice exports, leading to negative 
impacts on the livelihoods of actors in the rice value 
chain, particularly small actors and women as a whole. 
Actions to reduce the negative impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic may include liquidity support, in terms of 
accessing and making good use of government and 
international survival funds, for small businesses. 
This should be complemented with the revision of the 
repayment terms of the funds borrowed by businesses 
before the COVID-19 pandemic, as directed by the 
Bank of Tanzania. Secondly, ensuring the smooth 
implementation of the guidelines issued by the regional 
committee on the facilitation of cross border trade could 
help to reduce the negative impact of the pandemic. 
The guidelines include allowing cargo trucks to cross 
the borders if they submit certificates from the member 
state that they have been screened in to show that they 
are not carrying the virus. This requires authorities at 
the borders to fast track verification of the certificate to 
avoid delays and frustrations among traders.
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ANNEXES
Annex 1: Interview guide for the first phase KIIs 
1.1 Stakeholders with the ability and willingness to discuss the political dimensions of the value chain
• What do you consider to be the major political economy dimensions of the functioning of the rice value chain 
in Tanzania?
• Are there competing interests among the actors and service providers (e.g. input suppliers, producers/
producer associations, millers/millers’ associations, and traders/traders’ associations, including exporters 
and importers) that seek to influence policy and outcomes with regard to the rice value chain? 
• Are there powerful non-value chain actors or service providers who require the rice value chain to function 
efficiently and successfully? If so, who are they and why? 
• What holding power do the different interest groups have?
• Which interest group or category of actors and/or service providers do you think has the most power to 
influence policy and the outcomes of the value chain?
1.2 Private sector stakeholders
• What do you think has been/is the major role of the private sector in the process of commercialising rice 
production in Tanzania?
• To what extent has the private sector been involved in the formulation of policies, strategies, and regulations 
related to the rice value chain?
• To what extent do you think these policies, strategies, and regulations have been implemented?
• Is the current policy and regulatory framework conducive for private sector participation in commercial 
activities in the rice value chain? If not conducive, what improvements do you think should be made?
• What do you think are the major factors that constrain private sector actors and service providers in the rice 
value chain?
1.3 Government
The rice sub-sector has long been identified by the government as a strategic priority for agricultural 
development due to its potential for improving food security and incomes for large numbers of rural 
households:
• What policy interventions have been designed to enhance the participation of different actors and service 
providers in the rice value chain commercialisation process?
• Are there any specific government interventions that are geared towards facilitating the participation of 
smallholder farmers (especially marginalised groups) in the commercialisation process? 
• What is the current government policy to protect domestic rice producers?
• How, and to what extent, have private sector stakeholders and development partners been involved 
designing policy interventions?
• What public private partnerships are in place that enhance the rice commercialisation process? 
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• To what extent has the government succeeded in attracting large scale investments and linking large scale 
investors with small scale producers in the rice value chain?
• What major challenges have been identified that act as limiting factors to the rice value chain commercialisation 
process in Tanzania?
• Climate change is one of the major challenges in rice production. What strategies are in place to reduce the 
effect of climate change?
1.4 Development partners
• Have you provided any support to the Tanzanian government in its efforts to develop the rice sector? If yes, 
which of the following support have you provided or you are currently providing?
 » Policy formulation
 » Policy review
 » Studies to inform the government to enable it to make evidence-based policy choices
 » Capacity building
 » Irrigation development
 » Other support (please specify)
1.5 Producers and producer organisations
• What incentive(s) made you invest in large scale rice production?
• How did you get land for rice production?
• Do you produce rainfed and/or irrigated rice?
• Are you in an out grower scheme?
• Do you have any contractual agreement? If so, explain the type of agreement?
• Are you a member of a producer organisation?
• How effective is your organisation in influencing policy?
• Indicate whether each of the following inputs and services is readily available, has limited availability, or is 
unavailable: 
 » Labour
 » Improved seeds
 » Inorganic fertiliser
 » Organic fertiliser 
 » Pesticides (insecticides, herbicides, fungicides)
 » Irrigation water
 » Mechanisation
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• To what extent do you use each of the above inputs and services?
• What challenge(s) constrain the use of the above inputs and services?
• Rice production has high labour demands. What are your sources of labour for rice production?
• Do you consider the business environment to be conducive for commercial rice production? If not, what are 
the major challenges?
1.6 Processors and processors’ associations
• When did you start your processing business and what prompted you to start the business?
• What is the scale of your processing unit? Do you consider it to be a medium or large scale processing unit?
• What is the major source of paddy for processing? Is it your own produce and/or paddy from smallholder 
producers?
• Have you made changes to your processing technology since you started rice processing?
• Do you have contractual agreements with the smallholder producers? If so, please give details of the 
agreement.
• Which of the following constrain the performance of your processing business:
 » The availability and/or price of paddy 
 » Electricity
 » Storage capacity
 » Access to markets for milled rice
 » Taxes
• Is there a rice processors’ association in Tanzania or in your location? If so, are you a member of the 
association?
• How effective is your organisation in protecting members’ interests and/or influencing policy?
• Do you consider the business environment to be conducive for commercial rice processing? If not, what are 
the major challenges?
1.7 Traders and traders’ associations
• When did you start your rice trading business and what prompted you to start the business?
• What is the scale of your trade business? Do you consider it to be a small, medium, or large scale trading 
business?
• Is your business entirely domestic and/or export trade?
• What is the major source of paddy/rice for trading? Do you produce your own rice and/or source rice from 
smallholder and/or medium/large scale producers?
• Do you have contractual agreements with the producers/processors who supply rice to you? If so, please 
give details of the contractual agreement.
• Which of the following constrain performance of your rice trading business:
 » The availability of paddy/rice 
 » Storage capacity
 » Taxes
 » Trade barriers
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 » Export procedures and associated costs
 » Import tariffs
• Is there a rice traders organisation in Tanzania or in your location? If so, are you a member of the organisation?
• How effective is your organisation in protecting members’ interests and/or influencing policy?
• Do you consider the business environment to be conducive for commercial rice trading? If not, what are the 
major challenges?
1.8 Input suppliers and other service providers
• Which of the following inputs and/or services do you supply to rice producers in your area:




 » Other (please specify)
• Do you think there is adequate demand for the input and/or service you are supplying?
• Are the rice producers willing and capable to pay for the inputs/services?
• Do you consider the business environment to be conducive for commercial supply of rice inputs and the 
provision of services? If not, what are the major challenges?
Annex 2: Second phase (follow-up interviews exploring issues related to the 
COVID-19 pandemic)
2.1 Government 
• What measures have been put in place by the government to support businesses to cope with the effects 
of COVID-19
• Has Tanzania benefitted from funds set aside by international organisations (e.g. the International Monetary 
Fund) for baling out COVID-19 affected businesses?
• If yes, how do businesses access such funds?
2.2 Private sector stakeholders
• To what extent have the private sector actors and service providers in the rice value chain has been affected 
by COVID-19?
• Which actors have been the most affected? (i.e. input suppliers, farmers, processors, traders)
• Are you aware of any government support for the actors and service providers?
• If yes, what type of support? How has the support been channeled to affected actors and service providers?
2.3 Farmers and farmer organisations
• Have your farming activities been affected by COVID-19? If yes, please explain.
• Which of the following have been affected?
 » Labour availability
 » Availability of other inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides
 » Access to extension services 
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 » Access to finance
 » Access to markets
• What measures, if any, have you put in place to overcome challenges to availability of labour and other 
inputs, access to extension services, access to finance, and access to market? 
• Have you incurred any loss as a result of COVID-19?
• Have you received support from local government and/or other projects as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic?
2.4 Processors and processors’ associations
• Has your business been affected by COVID-19? If yes, please explain.
• Which of the following have been affected?
 » Availability of paddy for processing
 » Access to finance
 » Access to spare parts for processing facilities
• What measures, if any, have you put in place to overcome challenges to availability of paddy and access to 
finance? 
• Have you incurred any loss as a result of COVID-19?
• Have you received support from local government and/or other projects as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic?
• Have you started a new business or ventured into a new business opportunity arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic?
2.5 Traders and traders’ associations
• Has your business affected by the COVID-19? If yes, please explain.
• Which of the following have been affected?
 » Availability of paddy/rice
 » Access to finance
 » Access to domestic and export markets
• What measures, if any, have you put in place to overcome challenges to availability of paddy/rice, access to 
finance, and access to domestic and export markets? 
• Have you incurred any loss as a result of COVID-19?
• Have you received support from local government and/or other projects as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic?
• Have you started a new business or ventured into a new business opportunity arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic?
2.6 Input suppliers and other service providers 
• Has your business affected by COVID-19? If yes, please explain.
• Which of the following have been affected?
 » Supply of inputs and services
 » Demand for inputs and services
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 » Availability of transport
 » Access to finance
• What measures, if any, have you put in place to overcome challenges to supply of inputs/services, demand 
for inputs/services, availability of transport, and access to finance? 
• Have you incurred any loss as a result of COVID-19?
• Have you received support from local government and/or other projects as a result of the COVID-19 
pandemic?
• Have you started a new business or ventured into a new business opportunity arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic?
Annex 3: Trends in rice production, imports and consumption in Tanzania (1000t). 
Year Production Imports Exports
2000 781.54 280.45, 8.36
2001 867.69 202.33 9.29
2002 984.62 111.65 13.40
2003 1,096.92 275.78 13.24
2004 1,058.46 281.92 3.54
2005 1,167.69 109.183 13.54
2006 1,206.15 137.65 6.46
2007 1,341.85 71.15 29.35
2008 1,420.57 64.19 5.59
2009 1,334.80 39.60 0.81
2010 2,650.12 74.88 48.28
2011 2,248.32 50.85 35.18
2012 1,800.55 197.52 17.49
2013 2,194.75 284.79 51.43
2014 2,621.03 100.00 30.00
2015 2,652.00 220.00 30.00
2016 2,727.00 200.00 30.00
2017 2,576.00 200.00 25.00
2018 2,219.63 230.0 50.0
Source: Ministry of Agriculture Annual Reports, 2000–2018.
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